RealSecurity

You can’t pick up a paper, read a news article, or scan a blog without something about Cyberwar in there somewhere. Moreover, there are a number of books surfacing and, conservatively speaking, a great deal of activity in the government sector concerning cyberwar. This will be the first of several posts I’m planning on this topic. I want to talk about war, the cyber element, what’s happening today and things we can expect, what governments are up to, the physical realities of cyber war, and most importantly, the weaponization of cyberspace.

There is a lot to discuss and argue about when it comes to the term cyberwar, but first let’s try to define it a little. In short, cyberwar is the use of technology to render some form of harm against an enemy. Suffice it to say that we’re not talking about your typical hacker trying to steal credit card numbers.

Cyberwar is technically more of a statement of condition as opposed to a specific act, such as a battle or attack. The term is encompassing of all the different forms of attacks, defenses, and counter attacks that occur in the digital domain overtime. You hear some in the government make statements such as “we’re in a cyberwar,” referring to the vast number of attacks against government and private networks and systems from distant entities. These forms of attacks are on the rise and the US is clearly making the necessary political and military adjustments to address the threat (more on this in future posts).

On the other hand, you hear a more accurate representation of a cyberwar as a future condition where cyberattacks will have devastating results that are analogous to what we would see in conventional warfare. In many cases experts will refer to situations where an attacking force would use cyberweapons to bring down the power grid, financial system, communication networks, and the like (e.g., critical infrastructure) rendering them unusable.

In this future the difference between a cyberattack and a traditional attack is the physical infrastructure remains generally intact. For example, a bomb blowing up a critical power station clearly hinders the ability to distribute electricity until it is rebuilt consuming time and resources. Conversely, a cyberattack will render the deeply integrated computing systems temporarily useless, also hindering the ability to distribute electricity. Although the physical asset is unaffected this scenario, the end result is very similar to a physical attack – electricity cannot be delivered to homes, businesses, and other utilities for a period of time.

Of course, we have to acknowledge that a well-formed cyberattack can make computers perform dangerous acts that can manifest themselves as physical destruction. An example would be opening waste gates on a sewer system to dump raw sewage into the environment, or redirecting trains placing them on a collision course, or channeling electricity in a manner that overloads systems, such as lines and transformers, causing them to explode or become completely inoperable, or disrupting air and ground control greatly increasing the potential for a devastating accident. The list is very long. Think of all the computer controlled elements in our lives and about how the “logic” of their control could be manipulated to cause physical damage.

More importantly, we have to understand the condition and sensitivity of today’s major countries. In WWII it took a bomb to destroy an asset, such as a train, manufacturing plant, airfield, roads and bridges to disrupt the stability of the enemy. However, today there is far more sensitivity to disruption. Let’s go back to the power station attack example. If power was lost for an extended period of time, say two weeks, in key locations, such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, Atlanta, Boston, and the like, the U.S. would be brought to its knees. Financial systems would strain to a point of failure, emergency services would rapidly become overloaded, products couldn’t be delivered, trains wouldn’t run, hospitals overrun, impassable traffic would form, and people – many of them – would die. Imagine if this occurred in the middle of winter or even summer. It would be a catastrophe. Therefore, a cyberattack against the power grid doesn’t have to physically destroy the power grid to cause massive damage and disruption because there is very little resilience in how our society functions. One critical aspect goes missing for a short period and the entire fabric begins to come apart.

This concept was demonstrated in the recent Icelandic volcano eruption that virtually halted all air traffic between the US and Europe for weeks. This cost airlines millions, disrupted the travel plans of hundreds of thousands of people, and stopped the delivery of perishable resources, such as donated organs. The total cost in money and lives will never truly be known. Therefore, an attack against something like the power grid can cause mass disruption well beyond the targeted environment. We’re starting to get into the realm of cyberterrorism, but we’ll save that for another post.

Cyberwar is not your typical hacker attack. The difference, at least that I’ve found to date, is that cyberwar is when a cyberattack is launched or condoned by a country (e.g., formalized government), as opposed to being performed by a group, such as a terrorist group or cybercriminals performing acts of vigilantism or some skewed version of patriotism. A cyberwar is considered a “hack” – using the term very loosely – by a nation, government, and/or military to harm other countries. Granted, the lines are very blurry, especially when governments permit cybercriminals to operate in their country or turn a blind eye, which can be construed as supporting the effort. But in general, cyberwar is considered a military action funded and driven by an established government.

Cyberwar is sometimes confused with the recent advent of counties using cyberwar-like tactics for various purposes – such as espionage or general disruption. For example, there is some evidence that the Chinese government was behind Project Aurora against Google and other companies. Or the formation of China’s Ghoastnet where over a thousand computers in over a hundred countries were infected with more than 30% considered high valued targets, such as computers in embassies, international organization, news media, and ministries of foreign affairs, among others. These are examples of the escalation to cyberwar. Blatant attacks against digital assets around the world. It’s easy to see how these are examples of initial planning, testing of cyberweapons, and information gathering.

Although it may be obvious at this point, I am of the school that cyberwar is a future state. Although attacks are constantly occurring all over the world, I – at this point in time – cannot think of one attack in recent history that resulted in the “destruction” of a critical infrastructure. Keep in mind that I’m thinking in terms of “war”. Therefore, the teenager that shutdown electricity 100,000 homes in TX a few years ago does not fall into cyberwar, as far as I’m concerned. This is more along the lines of cyberterrorism. Regardless, what we’re seeing today is not what I would call cyberwar, but more so cyberattacks that are testing the bounds of what is possible. In some discussion I’ve referred to attacks of this nature as live-fire weapons testing. I vividly recall conversations with folks in the FBI when SQLSlammer hit and everyone was convinced that it was nothing more than a delivery system test – the payload was just a second thought, a diversion tactic. We’ll get more into this topic in my post on cyber weaponization.

Cyberwar is scary because of a few interesting attributes that are a little different from traditional warfare as we generally understand it making it somewhat complicated:

There is a great deal of anonymity, generally referred to in cyberwar circles as the “attribution problem”, representing the deniability of the attacker. Although there are technologies that help to identify the source of a cyberattack they do not provide indisputable evidence, at least not in the eyes of the international community. This attribute represents fundamental counterattack challenge. In conventional war the source point of a fired weapon or the location of a threatening weapon system is rapidly identified and quickly targeted for destruction. In cyberwar the attribution problem makes effective combatant identification nearly impossible. You may be able to determine what systems are attacking and from what location, but this is not enough to attribute to the real enemy.

Force multiplication using resources that are not directly related to the attacking country. For example, in conventional warfare there are tanks, planes, and other assets directly associated with the attacking force and are therefore quantifiable targets. In cyberwar a country will likely take control of computing resources, such as hundreds of thousands or millions of personal computers around the world from which to launch an attack. This too makes a counterattack extraordinarily complex and fraught with risk. If not planned and executed with acute accuracy, a force could inadvertently take down a neutral country or ally.

These two simple and basic codependent features create an environment that is difficult to fully engage. For example, assume that the US imposes additional strict sanctions against North Korea as a result of the recent sinking of a South Korean vessel and in retaliation the North Korean government wages a cyberattack against the American financial system. In doing so they utilize a vast network of commandeered computers in Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belarus to launch a well-planned attack through a complex web of command and control systems spread across a number of other counties. Within minutes the financial system begins to strain, automatic financial controls become engaged, and within the next 24 hours the system fails. The US government has few options, if any for an offensive. Resources are directed to defensive tactics to stem the tide, establish protective measures to thwart the attack as much as possible, and start recovery processes. In short, the attacker is everywhere, including inside your environment.

You can’t simply start taking down systems because they may be owned by allies or may be your own systems working against you. Meanwhile, the impact to the US is not unlike if a bomb were dropped in the middle of a major city. Therefore, in cyberwar there is a great deal of ambiguity and uncertainty, yet the level of impact is, on a very fundamental level, not all that different from an equally well-formed conventional attack.

This reality does impose a sense of fear that if truly understood and acknowledge throughout society would equal or even surpass levels of fear experienced during the cold war and the threat of nuclear annihilation. It’s ultimately based on the feeling of helplessness and the inability to respond. However, this is not entirely the situation that is evolving today.

In my next post I’m going to talk about weaponization of cyberspace, the cyber cold war, and then I will elaborate on the future “theater of war” setting the foundation for sharing views of what WWIII could look like.